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Global Concerns Regarding Novel Influenza A (H7N9) Virus 
Infections
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Severe disease in humans caused by a novel influenza A virus that is distinct from 
circulating human influenza A viruses is a seminal event. It might herald sporadic human 
infections from an animal source — e.g., highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A 
(H5N1) virus; or it might signal the start of an influenza pandemic — e.g., influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. Therefore, the discovery of novel influenza A (H7N9) virus 
infections in three critically ill patients reported in the Journal by Gao and colleagues (pages 
1888–1897) is of major public health significance. Chinese scientists are to be congratulated 
for the apparent speed with which the H7N9 virus was identified, and whole viral genome 
sequences were made publicly available in relatively short order. Because this H7N9 virus 
has not been detected in humans or animals previously, the situation raises many urgent 
questions and global public health concerns.
The key question for pandemic risk assessment is whether there is evidence of either limited 
or, more important, sustained human-to-human transmission — the latter being indicative of 
an emerging pandemic. If human-to-human transmission occurs, transmission dynamics, 
modes of transmission, basic reproductive number, and incubation period must all be 
determined. It is possible that these severely ill patients represent the tip of the iceberg and 
that there are many more as-yet-undetected mild and asymptomatic infections. Determining 
the spectrum of illness will help us understand the scope of the problem and assess severity. 
Enhanced surveillance for H7N9 virus infection is therefore urgently needed among 
hospitalized patients and outpatients of all ages with less severe respiratory illness. Other 
useful information can be derived from monitoring close contacts of patients with confirmed 
H7N9 cases to assess whether family members or health care personnel who provided care 
for patients with H7N9 virus infection have respiratory illness and laboratory-confirmed 
H7N9 virus infection. Such investigations will clarify whether H7N9 virus transmission in 
people appears efficient, or whether limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission is 
occurring in persons with prolonged unprotected exposures, such as in clusters of HPAI 
H5N1 cases in blood-related family members. So far, the information provided by Chinese 
health officials provides reassurance that sustained human-to-human transmission is not 
occurring.
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In addition to causing severe illness and deaths, the novel H7N9 viruses reported by Gao and 
colleagues have genetic characteristics that are of concern for public health. The 
hemagglutinin (HA) sequence data suggest that these H7N9 viruses are a low-pathogenic 
avian influenza A virus and that infection of wild birds and domestic poultry would 
therefore result in asymptomatic or mild avian disease, potentially leading to a “silent” 
widespread epizootic in China and neighboring countries. If H7N9 virus infection is 
primarily zoonotic, as reports currently suggest, transmission is expected to occur through 
exposure to clinically normal but infected poultry, in contrast to HPAI H5N1 virus infection, 
which typically causes rapid death in infected chickens.
The gene sequences also indicate that these viruses may be better adapted than other avian 
influenza viruses to infecting mammals. For example, the presence of Q226L in the HA 
protein has been associated with reduced binding to avian-like receptors bearing sialic acids 
linked to galactose by α-2,3 linkages found in the human lower respiratory tract,1 and 
potentially an enhanced ability to bind to mammalian-like receptors bearing sialic acids 
linked to galactose by α-2,6 linkages located in the human upper airway.1 Equally troubling 
is that Q226L in HA has been shown to be associated with transmission of HPAI H5N1 
viruses by respiratory droplets in ferrets, one of the animal models for assessing 
pathogenicity and transmissibility of influenza viruses.2,3 These H7N9 viruses also possess 
the E627K substitution in the PB2 protein, which has also been associated with mammalian 
adaptation and respiratory-droplet transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets.3 This H7N9 
virus is a novel reassortant with HA and neuraminidase (NA) genes from an ancestral avian 
H7N9 virus and the six other genes from an avian H9N2 virus. The animal reservoir now 
appears to be birds, but many experts are asking whether these viruses might also be able to 
infect pigs, another common reservoir for zoonotic infections. The viral sequence data 
indicate antiviral resistance to the adamantanes and susceptibility to neuraminidase 
inhibitors, except for an R292K mutation in the NA protein of the A/Shanghai/1/2013 virus. 
Because this mutation has been associated with in vitro resistance to neuraminidase 
inhibitors in another N9 NA subtype virus, additional analyses must be undertaken to 
understand its significance. It is not known whether this mutation arose de novo in the host 
or is associated with oseltamivir treatment. On-going surveillance is crucial to assessing the 
emergence and prevalence of H7N9 viruses resistant to available antivirals.
Since available diagnostic assays used in clinical care (e.g., rapid influenza diagnostic tests) 
may lack sensitivity to identify H7N9 virus and since existing molecular assays will identify 
H7N9 virus as a nonsubtypeable influenza A virus, a critical public health issue is the rapid 
development, validation, and deployment of molecular diagnostic assays that can 
specifically detect H7N9 viral RNA. Such assays have been developed in China and are in 
development in many countries including the United States, and they will be deployed as 
they were for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.4 Having available H7-specific assays will facilitate 
surveillance of H7N9 virus infections and help address key questions such as the duration of 
viral shedding, the infectious period, the optimal clinical specimens for laboratory 
confirmation, and the spectrum of clinical illness.
The clinical features described in the three patients with H7N9 virus infection, including 
fulminant pneumonia, respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), 
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septic shock, multiorgan failure, rhabdomyolysis, and encephalopathy, are very troubling. 
Clinical care of severely ill patients should be focused on evidence-based supportive 
management of complications such as ARDS. Adherence to recommended infection-control 
measures in clinical settings to reduce the risk of nosocomial transmission cannot be 
overemphasized.
All three patients with H7N9 virus infection reported by Gao and colleagues received late 
treatment with oseltamivir starting on day 7 or 8 of illness while critically ill. Data related to 
human infections with seasonal, pandemic, and HPAI H5N1 viruses indicate that the earlier 
antiviral treatment is initiated, the greater the clinical benefit. Therefore, oral oseltamivir or 
inhaled zanamivir should be administered to patients with suspected or confirmed H7N9 
virus infection as soon as possible. Secondary invasive bacterial infections associated with 
influenza can cause severe and fatal complications, and appropriate empirical antibiotic 
treatment for community-acquired bacterial infections may be indicated for initial 
management of severe H7N9 pneumonia. Caution should be exercised regarding the use of 
glucocorticoids, which are not indicated for routine treatment of influenza. Clinical research, 
including randomized, controlled trials and observational studies, is urgently needed on new 
antiviral agents, including parenteral neuraminidase inhibitors and drugs with different 
mechanisms of action, combination antiviral treatment, and immunotherapy. To inform 
clinical management, rapid clinical data collection, data sharing, analysis, and timely 
feedback are needed worldwide.5
Because H7N9 virus infections have not occurred in humans before, it is expected that 
persons of all ages might be susceptible worldwide. Serologic assays must be developed so 
that studies can be conducted to determine whether some people have cross-reactive 
antibodies to these viruses from prior influenza A virus infections. Existing H7-vaccine 
viruses are not well matched to this novel H7N9 virus, and extensive efforts are under way 
to develop potential H7N9 vaccines as quickly as possible. These efforts have started 
worldwide using the H7N9 sequence data obtained from these early cases, and sharing of 
H7N9 viruses will further facilitate vaccine development. There are many challenges to 
making H7N9 vaccines available. Previously studied H7 vaccines were poorly immunogenic 
in humans, and clinical trials to assess the safety and immunogenicity of H7N9 vaccine 
candidates will be needed. But even if new vaccine manufacturing technologies, such as 
tissue-cell-culture–derived vaccine antigens, are utilized, the process from vaccine 
development to availability will probably take many months.
The 2009 H1N1 pandemic taught us many lessons, including that a pandemic virus can 
emerge from an animal reservoir in an unexpected location and be spread rapidly through air 
travel. The focus on critically ill adults early in the pandemic led to elevated public concern 
about pandemic severity. Clear communication of key messages to the public and the clinical 
community is critical in implementing successful prevention and control activities. The 
detection of human H7N9 virus infections is yet another reminder that we must continue to 
prepare for the next influenza pandemic. The coming weeks will reveal whether the 
epidemiology reflects only a widespread zoonosis, whether an H7N9 pandemic is beginning, 
or something in between. The key is intensified surveillance for H7N9 virus in humans and 
animals to help answer important questions. We cannot rest our guard.
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